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which is a problem. An entire industry conducting all of its business in cash cannot be fairly taxed or regulated
and, historically, has been associated with lawlessness—everything from security concerns, transportation
and currency problems, money laundering, and cash hoarding. This brief reviews and analyzes the issues that
surround marijuana banking and offers several policy options for addressing the tension between federal
enforcement and state sovereignty as it related to marijuana banking.
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SUMMARY
•  Although cannabis-related businesses have thrived in the locali-
ties that have legalized marijuana as a consumer product, the 
industry has suffered from crippling uncertainty, in the form 
of limited access to the banking system.
•  The cannabis industry thus has been forced to operate in a 
cash-intensive “gray market,” which is a problem. An entire 
industry conducting all of its business in cash cannot be fairly 
taxed or regulated and, historically, has been associated with 
lawlessness—everything from security concerns, transportation 
and currency problems, money laundering, and cash hoarding.
•  This brief reviews and analyzes the issues that surround mari-
juana banking, paying particular attention to the example of 
Colorado’s Fourth Corner Credit Union, chartered in 2014 to 
serve the “unique financial needs” of cannabis-related busi-
nesses, but whose application for a master account from the 
U.S. Federal Reserve System was denied because of marijuana’s 
continued illegality at the federal level.
•  Several policy options are available for addressing the tension 
between federal enforcement and state sovereignty as it relates 
to marijuana banking. On the extreme ends, Congress could 
do nothing until the tension reaches a crisis point; or, it could 
follow the lead of states like Colorado and legalize marijuana 
completely. But there are several reasonable “middle ground” 
options as well, laid out in the conclusion of the brief.
In the last five years, eight states and the District of Columbia have legalized 
marijuana for recreational use.
Industry analysts forecast that revenues from canna-
bis-related taxes alone will eclipse one billion dollars 
in 2018.1 The industry has suffered from crippling 
uncertainty, however, in the form of limited access to 
the banking system, even before the Trump Adminis-
tration’s apparent reversal of earlier accommodations 
of these state experiments. And without access to 
banking, marijuana businesses are difficult to regulate 
and tax with any accuracy.2 An audit in 2017 by the 
city of Sacramento, for example, found that because 
of the cash-intensive nature of the medical marijuana 
business, some dispensaries there were not sharing 
proper receipts or were filing inaccurate or mislead-
ing financial statements. The head of the city’s Office 
of Cannabis Policy & Enforcement estimated that 
the consequent tax revenue loss totals $9 million 
annually—which dwarfs the $5 million that Sacra-
mento actually collects from fees and taxes on annual 
reported marijuana sales.3  As we look to the future, 
state experimentation with legalized marijuana will 
remain small, uncertain, and unsafe, and the poten-
tial tax revenue benefits of it will not be maximized, 
until there is a national, legislative resolution of this 
national, legal problem. 
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This Issue Brief outlines some of 
the history around the issue of mari-
juana banking and offers suggestions 
to the federal and state governments 
that continue to navigate a world 
where marijuana is a recreational 
consumer product according to the 
laws of some states and an illicit drug 
according to the law in the United 
States.4 The upshot is simple: so long 
as the U.S. government, in states 
and at the national level, speak with 
contradictory voices, those who par-
ticipate in the marijuana industry will 
continue to introduce the social harms 
often associated with gray markets. 
This is particularly acute given the 
vital necessity to any business, large or 
small, to have access to a functioning 
financial system.5 With the national 
government moving in one direc-
tion and states moving in another, 
marijuana-related businesses and the 
banks that might serve them cannot 
cohere on a viable business plan. The 
result will continue to be legal, practi-
cal, economic, and social dysfunction. 
This federalist experiment divides the 
governmental house against itself. 
We either must embrace the experi-
mental nature of our federalist form 
of government and allow the states 
their right to embark on this new 
business, or else forcibly eliminate the 
experiment with legalized marijuana 
altogether.
It is in Colorado that we find 
perhaps the clearest case of what 
happens when a legitimate institu-
tion tries to provide financial services 
directly to the cannabis industry and 
nevertheless fails when it comes up 
against obstacles imposed by federal 
statutes and regulations. After a brief 
recap of marijuana enforcement, with 
a particular focus on recent history, I 
will analyze the precedent set in the 
case of Colorado’s Fourth Corner 
Credit Union. Its lessons are integral 
to any discussion about marijuana 
banking. I will then address the prob-
lems with the status quo and examine 
the proposal—along with its major 
implications and policy barriers—that 
the federal government get out of the 
business of regulating and prosecuting 
marijuana altogether, leaving the states 
to do as they will with marijuana.
THE ENFORCEMENT 
PENDULUM 
In 1970, President Richard Nixon 
signed into law the Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse and Prevention and 
Control Act. Title II of the law is 
known as the Controlled Substances 
Act.6 Under this statute, the federal 
government classifies each drug under 
one of five Schedules that are based 
on a drug’s established medical value 
and its potential for abuse. Since 
1970, Congress has given much of 
the regulatory authority for enforcing 
the CSA to the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), with some 
assistance from other federal agencies, 
including the Department of Justice, 
the Food and Drug Administration, 
and the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services.
These statutes are exercises of 
national law-making authority, but 
state governments have retained their 
own drug-enforcement authority. For 
decades, the federal and state govern-
ments cooperated in drug enforce-
ment. But by the late 20th century 
and more robustly in the 21st, several 
states began treating different kinds 
of drugs differently. The main focus of 
that “legalization” movement, as it has 
been called, is on various forms and 
various uses of marijuana. 
In 1996, California voters passed 
Proposition 215, or the Compassion-
ate Use Act, which legalized—for the 
first time anywhere in the U.S.—the 
use of medical marijuana. Soon there-
after, instances arose in which the 
DEA seized cannabis from medical 
marijuana users, who took the federal 
 1  Debra Borchardt, “$1 Billion in Marijuana Taxes is Addictive 
to State Governors,” Forbes, April 11, 2017.
 2  See, e.g., Susan Cleary Morse, Stewart Karlinsky and 
Joseph Bankman (2009), “Cash Businesses and Tax 
Evasion,” 20 Stanford Law & Policy Review 37; and Sam 
Kamin (2014), “The Limits of Marijuana Legalization in the 
States,” 99 Iowa Law Review Bulletin 39, 47.
 3  Scott Thomas Anderson, “Up in Smoke: Audit Shows Some 
Sacramento Dispensaries Aren’t Paying Up,” Newsreview.
com, October 5, 2017. 
 4  For other useful summaries of the legal and policy issues 
addressed here, see Julie A. Hill (2015), “Banks, Marijuana, 
and Federalism,” Case Western Reserve Law Review, 
Vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 597-647 and Lee Reiners and John 
W. Matthews, “Federal Law Leaves Banks Shying Away 
from Marijuana Businesses,” The FinReg Blog, December 
5, 2016, available at https://sites.duke.edu/thefinreg-
blog/2016/12/05/federal-law-leaves-banks-shying-away-
from-marijuana-businesses/.
 5  Marijuana-related businesses must “rely on short-term 
loans from individuals, usually with higher interest rates” 
that also must be in cash. See Serge F. Kovaleski, “Banks 
Say No to Marijuana Money, Legal or Not,” The New York 
Times, January 11, 2014.
 6  Controlled Substances Act, available at https://www.law.
cornell.edu/uscode/text/21/812.
 7  Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), available at https://
supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/545/1/.
 8  James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, Memoran-
dum for All United States Attorneys: Guidance Re-
garding Marijuana Enforcement, August 29, 2013. 
Available at https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resourc-
es/3052013829132756857467.pdf.
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government to court. In the 2005 
landmark Gonzalez v. Raich case, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress’ 
Commerce Clause authority includes 
the power to prohibit the local 
cultivation and use of marijuana in 
compliance with California law, even 
if states approve its use for medicinal 
purposes and even if the use is entirely 
intrastate.7 Despite this ruling, four-
teen other states and the District of 
Columbia joined California by the 
end of 2012 in legalizing medical 
marijuana, and two states (Colorado 
and Washington) had voted to legalize 
the recreational use of the drug.
In 2013, in response to this spate 
of legalizations, the Department of 
Justice issued a memorandum—writ-
ten by Deputy Attorney General 
James Cole—explaining the DOJ’s 
enforcement priorities for the use, rec-
reational or otherwise, of marijuana. 
Known as the Cole Memorandum,8 
the document was not a binding 
regulation of the Department of Jus-
tice but a “guidance” that individuals, 
private-sector institutions, and gov-
ernments should follow with respect 
to marijuana enforcement.  
The Cole Memo did not provide a 
carte blanche for the sale, distribution, 
or use of marijuana in the states that 
had legalized it, but it did instruct 
U.S. attorneys to avoid seeking mari-
juana prosecutions in these states. It 
also called on these states to employ 
expansive compliance measures to 
ensure that other drug-enforcement 
priorities were met.9 Under this guid-
ance, states would have to meet eight 
criteria (i.e., enforcement priorities) 
to prevent federal interference—for 
example, blocking the drug from 
ending up in the hands of minors or 
from crossing state lines, and ensuring 
revenue did not end up in the hands 
of criminals. 
A year later, in 2014, the Finan-
cial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN), a joint operation of the 
DOJ and the Treasury Department, 
issued additional guidance govern-
ing the enforcement of anti-money 
laundering laws as relevant to the 
funding and distribution of marijuana 
by participants in the financial system. 
It attempted to facilitate a safe operat-
ing space for financial institutions 
to service the marijuana industry.10 
In the same year, the independent 
financial regulatory agencies—the 
Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit 
 9  Hill, supra note 4.
 10  The relevant guidance from FinCEN and the DOJ is avail-
able at http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_ regs/guidance/
pdf/FIN-2014-G001.pdf and http://www.justice.gov/usao/
waw/press/newsblog%20pdfs/DAG%20Memo%20-%20
Guidance%20Regarding%20Marijuana%20Related%20
Financial%20Crimes%202%2014%2014%20(2).pdf, 
respectively.
 11  See the letter from the financial regulators to Governor 
Islee, located here: https://www.dfi.wa.gov/documents/
banks/letter-agencies-respond-inslee-marijuana.pdf.
 12  Jefferson B. Sessions, Attorney General, Memorandum 
for All United States Attorneys: Marijuana Enforcement, 
January 4, 2018. Available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/
press-release/file/1022196/download.
 13  Jesse Paul and Jon Murray, “Cory Gardner says AG 
Jeff Sessions’ decision to rescind marijuana policy “has 
trampled on the will” of Colorado voters,” The Denver Post, 
January 4, 2018.
 14  Some banks, like MBank in Oregon, took initial steps 
towards servicing the marijuana industry, based upon the 
Cole Memo. MBank offered checking accounts to mari-
juana growers and distributors, but after several months, 
the bank closed all cannabis-related accounts. As the 
company’s CEO admitted, his bank was “not big enough” 
to deal with the regulations and due diligence required to 
service marijuana money. But other determined financial 
institutions made serious attempts at breaking the stale-
mate. See “MBank is Closing Its Marijuana Bank Accounts,” 
Willamette Week, Updated January 24, 2017.
 15  Credit union charters are given by the state, not by the 
federal government. 
 16  Chris Morran, “Pot-Centric Colorado Credit Union Sues 
NOTES 
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Insurance Corporation, the National 
Credit Union Administration, and the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency—indicated a willingness—but 
not a commitment—to use the same 
guidances in their supervisory exami-
nations.11
Then came the 2016 elections. One 
of the first nominations President-
elect Donald Trump made was for the 
new Attorney General. In Republi-
can Senator Jeff Sessions, President 
Trump installed a staunch critic of the 
legalization movement. And although 
marijuana policy was not the most 
pressing priority for the new DOJ, 
eventually Attorney General Ses-
sions announced an about face in his 
approach to prosecuting federal law as 
it relates to marijuana. On January 4, 
2018, Sessions reinforced the author-
ity of the CSA when he instructed 
U.S. attorneys “to use previously 
established prosecutorial principles” 
regarding federal marijuana enforce-
ment, nullifying the Cole Memoran-
dum.12
Some commentators have seen 
the Sessions announcement as a sud-
den change in federal policy.13 Even 
before this announcement, though, 
the Cole Memo provided the thin-
nest of protections for those financial 
institutions that sought the protec-
tion of state law in providing financial 
services to marijuana businesses. In 
practice, the non-binding nature of 
the promise of non-intervention from 
federal prosecutors and the unwilling-
ness of federal regulators to commit 
to a course of action was enough 
to scare most banks away, the Cole 
Memo (and its adoption by FinCEN) 
notwithstanding.14
A MICROCOSM OF THE 
BANKING PROBLEM
The fragility of the financial regulatory 
space surrounding marijuana didn’t 
deter every financial institution. Some 
hearty entrepreneurs saw the change 
in state law as an opportunity to bring 
the federal government kicking and 
screaming into the era of marijuana 
legalization. Fourth Corner Credit 
Union provides the best example of 
what happens when even motivated 
financial institutions face the reality of 
the state-federal mismatch. 
Fourth Corner Credit Union 
was chartered in Colorado with the 
full support of the state’s governor 
in late 2014. Colorado established 
thorough procedures for complying 
with the Cole Memo, and Fourth 
Corner in turn followed every rule 
the state imposed upon it in seeking 
its charter.15 The explicit mission of 
the credit union was to “service the 
unique financial needs of the cannabis 
and hemp industries and their sup-
porters.”16 In November 2014, Fourth 
Corner applied for a “master account” 
from the U.S. Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, as administered by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City (which 
oversees the payment system in the 
state of Colorado). A master account 
allows, among other things, a finan-
cial institution to engage in electronic 
credit and debit transactions with 
other financial institutions. Without it, 
a financial institution cannot function. 
Fourth Corner spent eight 
months answering questions from 
the Kansas City Fed. According to 
the credit union, master accounts 
are typically approved within one 
week. In July 2015, the Kansas City 
Fed informed Fourth Corner that it 
had not approved the credit union’s 
master account—essentially delivering 
a death sentence to Fourth Corner. 
As the credit union later stated, this 
denial turned a full-service financial 
institution into “nothing more than a 
vault.”17
The Fed based its decision largely 
on Fourth Corner’s inability to 
acquire deposit insurance from the 
National Credit Union Administra-
Federal Reserve Bank for Denying Account,” Consumerist, 
July 31, 2015. 
 17  The text of Fourth Corner’s complaint is available at https://
consumermediallc.files.wordpress.com/2015/07/fourth-
corner.pdf.
 18  Nathaniel Popper, “Banking for Pot Industry Hits a Road-
block,” The New York Times, July 30, 2015.
 19  Defendant Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Motion 
to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, Fourth Corner Credit 
Union v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2015 WL 
13021567 (D.Colo.) (October 21, 2015).
 20  Rules regarding the Fed’s provision of services are avail-
able at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/248a.
 21  Debra Borchardt, “Cannabis Credit Union Loses Case 
Against Fed Reserve Bank,” Forbes, January 8, 2016. 
 22  Fourth Corner Credit Union vs. Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City, 861 F. 3d 1052 (10th Cir. 2017).
 23  Hill, supra note 4.
 24  Dykema Gossett, “Fourth corner Credit Union Obtains Pyrrhic 
Victory for Marijuana Banking,” Lexology, June 30, 2017.
 25  Gonzalez v. Raich, supra note 7.
 26  The most recent Gallup survey found that 64 percent of 
U.S. adults, including a majority of Republicans, support 
legalization. See Justin McCarthy, “Record-High Support 
for Legalizing Marijuana in U.S.,” GALLUP News, October 
25, 2017.
 27  From the CSA: “The term “controlled substance” means a 
drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included 
in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this subchapter. The 
term does not include distilled spirits, wine, malt bever-
ages, or tobacco, as those terms are defined or used in 
subtitle E of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.” Available 
at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/21/802.
NOTES 
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tion (NCUA). For its part, the NCUA 
did not believe Fourth Corner would 
be able to manage the risk of work-
ing within a single industry that had 
no track record and that remained 
illegal nationally.18 But the Fed also 
made clear that the concern wasn’t 
specific to Fourth Corner. The Fed had 
a problem with marijuana. As the Fed 
made clear in subsequent litigation, 
Colorado’s legalization of marijuana 
was the same “as if Colorado enacted 
a scheme to allow trade in endangered 
species or trade with North Korea.”19 
The credit union, according to the 
Fed, did not have the right to inject 
state marijuana money into the federal 
banking system, given the illegality of 
cannabis at the federal level. 
Fourth Corner filed a lawsuit 
against the Fed, claiming that the 
Fed’s own rules do not give it discre-
tion in deciding which institutions 
should be disqualified from master 
account access, nor do they explic-
itly allow for decisions to be based 
on those of other agencies, like the 
NCUA.20 A federal district court 
dismissed the lawsuit. Fourth Corner 
built its case upon the Cole Memo’s 
guidelines, while the Fed, along with 
many private financial institutions, 
argued that those guidelines provided 
no binding protection from prosecu-
tion. The court agreed with the Kansas 
City Fed, but admitted that “the 
situation [is] untenable” and required 
resolution by Congress.21 
Fourth Corner quickly appealed 
the decision. In June 2017, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals issued its 
decision in the case of Fourth Corner 
Credit Union v. Federal Reserve Bank 
of Kansas City.22 The court’s opinion 
is dizzying, and illustrates well the 
rank confusion that the state-federal 
mismatch sows in this area of law. 
The three-judge panel could not 
agree on the disposition of the case. 
One judge would have sided with the 
Kansas City Fed (and the lower court) 
because marijuana distribution is 
illegal, and a bank that services these 
entities is breaking the law. Another 
judge would have dismissed the case 
on procedural grounds, holding that 
the credit union could have received 
its master account if it promised not to 
service marijuana-related businesses. 
And the third judge would have over-
ruled the lower court and granted the 
credit union’s request for a master 
account. The consequence of this kind 
of division was to settle on the least-
common denominator: Fourth Corner 
could amend its complaint and seek 
again a master account, subject to a 
commitment to follow the law. 
While Fourth Corner could 
declare a partial victory, this ruling 
effectively prohibited it from servic-
ing the only clientele for whom it was 
originally formed. 
The experience of Fourth Corner 
demonstrates a few key points about 
the fragility of marijuana banking. 
First, the Federal Reserve’s control 
over access to its payment systems 
gives it significant regulatory and 
supervisory control to which courts 
will defer.23 Second, the CSA remains 
dominant in any debate over sover-
eignty on the marijuana issue, gener-
ally. And third, states will not be able 
to circumvent federal statutes in order 
to solve the problem of marijuana 
banking simply by chartering and 
endorsing special financial institu-
tions.24 Even though the master 
account application was historically 
pro forma, a commitment to abiding 
by federal law—whatever the state law 
may allow—is still a requirement.
POLICY SOLUTIONS: TWO 
APPROACHES TO REJECT, 
ONE TO ACCEPT 
The federal government in all three 
branches—the President, the Con-
gress, and the courts—will have to 
decide how to manage the increasing 
 28  James Higdon, “Did Jeff Sessions Just Increase the Odds Con-
gress Will Make Marijuana Legal?” Politico, January 6, 2018.
 29  Available at https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/
single-convention.html.
 30  Panam Post Staff, “Uruguay Stands Up to UN on Marijuana 
Legalization,” PanamPost, June 29, 2015.
 31  Press Release from Senator Jeff Merkley, available at https://
www.merkley.senate.gov/news/press-releases/bipartisan-
group-of-senators-introduces-legislation-to-provide-ac-
cess-to-banking-services-for-legal-cannabis-businesses.
 32  Hill, supra note 4.
 33  Jordan Wathen, “Bank of Pot: Why Some Banks Are Diving In to 
the Marijuana Business,” The Motley Fool, January 14, 2018. 
 34  Aaron Gregg, “How a Maryland bank is quietly solving the 
marijuana industry’s cash problem,” The Washington Post, 
January 2, 2018. (“Each day, dispensaries must email the 
bank detailed daily financial and inventory logs from Metric, 
the software system that regulators use to track marijuana 
from seed to sale.”)
NOTES 
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conflict between federal enforce-
ment and state sovereignty. The 
Sessions announcement, unfortu-
nately, increases the tension between 
the federal and state governments. The 
United States cannot long remain in 
the present stalemate because, crucially, 
the marijuana industry continues to 
thrive. And an industry like this will 
demand access to financial services. 
An entire industry conducting all of its 
business in cash cannot be fairly taxed 
or regulated and, historically, has been 
associated with lawlessness—every-
thing from security concerns, transpor-
tation and currency problems, money 
laundering, and cash hoarding. If the 
federal government—Congress in par-
ticular—ignores this issue, it will soon 
face a public policy crisis.  What, then, 
to do to resolve this tension? I explore 
below the spectrum of alternatives. 
First, Congress can do nothing. 
The status quo, in that event, will see a 
one-way ratchet in a growing demand 
for marijuana in the states that legalize 
it, pushing its use further and further 
into black and gray markets. Although 
there is ample legal authority for the 
federal government to insist on its 
supremacy in this space,25 this tension 
will likely foment a political reaction 
and lead to policy upheaval. 
There is much to be said for this 
strategy. We are not yet at a fevered 
pitch of instability. Perhaps forc-
ing the federal government to react, 
or the states to retrench, will be the 
correct move. A political solution is 
more likely to follow a crisis made by 
politicians. And it is not a stretch to 
characterize any resulting crisis around 
the legitimacy of state-sanctioned 
marijuana use as largely a creation  
of politicians. 
At the other extreme, Congress 
can follow the lead of Colorado and 
legalize marijuana completely. There is 
certainly political enthusiasm for that 
kind of legislation in some corners. 
Federal legalization would preempt 
states that choose to criminalize mari-
juana’s use, imposing a single policy 
on the entire country. 
The problem with that opposite 
extreme is that it removes author-
ity from the states to chart their own 
course. Colorado currently takes a 
different view on marijuana use from 
its neighbor, Utah. Perhaps Utahans 
are wrong, Coloradans are right. 
But perhaps we simply don’t know 
enough about the strange new world 
of legalized marijuana. Better than 
imposing a single, national solution 
on a complex policy domain, Congress 
should allow the states to take dif-
ferent views on this question. Doing 
so will provide more information for 
citizens to understand what marijuana 
use means for the health and welfare 
of their citizens. We know very little 
about the consequences of long-term, 
legal marijuana use in the United 
States. Enthusiasm for marijuana use 
may be on the rise in light of that lack 
of knowledge.26 Certainly, tobacco 
use has become increasingly disfa-
vored, even as marijuana has grown 
in popularity. Thus, allowing states to 
experiment in their approaches to this 
delicate issue will ultimately provide 
the kind of information that should 
inform the citizenry. Cutting it off 
with national homogenization is a 
move too far. 
The best approach, then, is a more 
tailored one that allows states to pur-
sue their own interests in this sensitive 
area without requiring a national crisis 
to spur change. The following propos-
als reflect that preference for a middle 
road and present a suite of options for 
Congress to pursue.  
1. MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION,  
FULL STOP 
Congress could respect the wishes 
of the states and treat marijuana as 
it does other, arguably more harm-
ful drugs like alcohol and tobacco.27 
A move like this would give states 
the license to control the use of the 
drug within their own borders as they 
see fit without fear of a superseding 
authority. One example of legisla-
tion that advocates for this type of 
approach is the Ending Federal 
Marijuana Prohibition Act, sponsored 
by Rep. Thomas Garrett (R-VA). It 
would remove marijuana from Sched-
ule 1 and eliminate federal penalties 
for anyone engaged in state-legal 
marijuana activity.28 There are fewer 
hurdles to this approach than there is 
with re-scheduling marijuana.
Full-press legalization, though, 
is complicated by the United States’ 
international commitments and raises 
questions for those states (like Utah) 
that may prefer a different course.  
International treaties, such as the 
UN’s Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs (1961),29 requires the U.S. to 
enforce international sanctions on 
marijuana. Some countries appear to 
have had success recently in walking 
away from these sanctions—includ-
ing Uruguay after its national legal-
ization of marijuana—so there is 
precedent for the U.S. to attempt the 
same maneuver.30 And there are easy 
carve-outs that could be included 
for those states who wish to cut a 
different path. Ending prohibitions 
7publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
in this incremental way could be 
the viable path for simplifying the 
state-national tensions that currently 
plague the system.
2. RECLASSIFICATION 
Congress has historically left drug 
scheduling up to the DEA, but it 
could change a drug’s schedule itself 
by legislation. By reclassifying mari-
juana as a Schedule II drug, rather 
than its current status as a Sched-
ule I drug, Congress would permit 
broader use and experimentation 
under the supervision of doctors and 
pharmacists. Simply re-scheduling 
marijuana would likely be insuf-
ficient and inapplicable, giving the 
country the worst of all worlds. A 
rescheduled marijuana would be dif-
ficult if not impossible for states to 
forbid. And to even qualify, research-
ers would have to prove in a clinical 
setting that the drug has “medical 
benefits” that outweigh the costs. 
Furthermore, Schedule II drugs are 
still mostly restricted (in that they 
require a prescription), so it would 
be far from full legalization. Reclas-
sification, then, could help resolve 
banks that that fund marijuana-
related businesses, but only insofar as 
those business models are aimed at a 
Schedule-II-type understanding of 
marijuana, a framework inapplicable 
to states like Colorado, California,  
or Washington.
3.  LEGISLATION THAT SINGLES 
OUT BANKING
Another approach would leave in 
place existing federal laws govern-
ing marijuana but target banking 
as a means for allowing marijuana-
related businesses to participate 
in the financial system. This is an 
approach favored by Senator Jeff 
Merkeley (D-OR) and Represen-
tative Ed Perlmutter (D-CO) in 
their Secure and Fair Enforcement 
(SAFE) Banking Act of 2017. This 
legislation would favor incum-
bent banks by ignoring the master 
account issue discussed above in 
the Fourth Corner case, but would 
provide clarity and some incentives 
for existing financial institutions to 
service marijuana-related businesses. 31 
There is much that is laudable 
about this effort, but its exclusion of 
protections for new entrants, with no 
capital, would mean that an already 
concentrated industry would remain 
entrenched, leaving little space for 
outside innovation. Ultimately, the 
picking of winners and losers is best 
left to the marijuana industry itself. 
The SAFE Banking Act should 
therefore be changed to allow for 
that kind of entrance. 
Still, giving a legislative green 
light to well-established banks might 
seem like a welcome change from 
the status quo for marijuana busi-
nesses. We have not seen sufficient 
clarity around banking the mari-
juana industry to know how existing 
financial institutions would approach 
this situation. The compliance costs 
may overshadow any profits from an 
industry still in its infancy, should 
federal financial regulators set too 
high a bar for anti-money launder-
ing and safety and soundness due 
diligence requirements.32 Even so, 
this kind of approach may well give 
banks and marijuana-related busi-
nesses the space needed to continue, 
incrementally, the great cannabis 
experiment already well underway. 
4. THE REGULATORY APPROACH 
Whether Congress proceeds in this 
incremental fashion or not, states 
where marijuana is legalized to some 
extent or another will still need the 
support of federal financial regula-
tors. Specifically, it remains unclear 
at the time this Issue Brief goes to 
press how and whether the financial 
regulators will react to the Sessions 
announcement. The financial regula-
tors—the National Credit Union 
Administration, the Federal Reserve, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, and the Comptroller 
of the Currency— would have to be 
willing, as an official policy, to grant 
access to share or deposit insurance 
to banking institutions that work 
with marijuana-related businesses. 
And the Federal Reserve would have 
to treat all state-chartered institu-
tions alike, granting master accounts 
and opening up their payment sys-
tems to entities like Fourth Corner, 
regardless of clientele. Again, as 
long as the CSA remains intact, this 
is unlikely to happen, as the prec-
edent set in the Fourth Corner case 
demonstrates.
THE LIMITS OF A DIVIDED 
HOUSE
According to a July 2017 report 
from FinCEN, as many as 390 
banks and credit unions are accept-
ing deposits from marijuana busi-
nesses.33 The Washington Post recently 
profiled the Maryland-based Severn 
Savings Bank, a community bank 
offering business accounts to several 
marijuana dispensaries and growers 
in the state. In exchange for a large 
monthly fee and rigorous daily self-
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compliance, Severn’s accounts allow 
them to “pay employees through an 
automatic debit system, buy sup-
plies with a debit card and purchase 
marijuana through wire transfers.”34 
However, they cannot write checks 
from (or accept them into) their 
account, nor can they accept credit 
cards, as those activities require 
access to federally regulated payment 
systems. They also cannot apply 
for small-business loans, which are 
necessary not only for the further 
growth of individual companies, but 
for the marijuana industry as well. 
Severn Savings Bank is also 
exposing itself to some kinds of risk 
in the face of the changing political 
landscape. If I were advising Severn 
today, I would strongly urge a reex-
amination of this approach in light 
of the Sessions announcement that 
the Cole Memo is no longer in force. 
That uncertain world is where we 
remain. The United States is a house 
divided on marijuana policy—a real-
ity unlikely to change in the short 
term. Only Congress can definitively 
resolve this morass of conflicts. 
Members of Congress should do so 
with a steady eye and an incremen-
talist approach. Cutting off access 
to finance and banking will push 
a legally ambiguous set of activi-
ties even further into the shadows. 
And, in the process, it will continue 
to deprive cities and states, not to 
mention the federal government, 
from more fully reaping the benefit of 
assessing and collecting tax revenue 
from economic activity in what has 
become a booming industry. Offer-
ing a halfway guarantee that federal 
enforcement priorities will be focused 
elsewhere is inadequate, as the 
Sessions reversal shows. Either the 
federal government should under-
take the political project necessary to 
convince the states that they should 
reverse their legalization efforts, or 
it should learn to live peaceably with 
those states by facilitating the legality, 
safety, and transparency of the full 
financial system.
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